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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity potentially provides an important means for generating cooperation
based on helping those who help others. However, the use of ‘image scores’ to summarize
individuals’ past behaviour presents a dilemma: individuals withholding help from those of
low image score harm their own reputation, yet giving to defectors erodes cooperation. Ex-
plaining how indirect reciprocity could evolve has therefore remained problematic. In all pre-
vious treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals are assigned potential recipients and
decide whether to cooperate or defect based on their reputation. A second way of achieving
discrimination is through partner choice, which should enable individuals to avoid defectors.
Here, I develop a model in which individuals choose to donate to anyone within their group,
or to none. Whereas image scoring with random pairing produces cycles of cooperation and
defection, with partner choice there is almost maximal cooperation. In contrast to image
scoring with random pairing, partner choice results in almost perfect contingency, producing
the correlation between giving and receiving required for cooperation. In this way, partner
choice facilitates much higher and more stable levels of cooperation through image scoring
than previously reported and provides a simple mechanism through which systems of help-
ing those who help others can work.
Introduction
If an individual helps someone on the basis that they have helped others, indirect reciprocity
can be said to be in action [1]. Indirect reciprocity is an important concept because it is integral
to the notion that we may benefit from being seen to be cooperative. Furthermore, it is not de-
pendent upon repeated meeting between the same pair of individuals [2]. These factors suggest
that indirect reciprocity may have been important in the development of human sociality, and
may have co-evolved with morality and language [3].
Models of indirect reciprocity show that cooperation (sensu paying a cost to benefit another,
e.g. [4]) is possible, but that it is cyclically unstable, with defection being as likely as cooperation
[2]. Image scoring, which represents cooperating and defecting histories positively and nega-
tively, has an Achilles heel because withholding help from defectors harms ego’s reputation, yet
providing help erodes the discrimination required for cooperation. Experiments show that
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people do reward those who are generous to others [5–8] and that this may contribute to solv-
ing social dilemmas [9,10]. Thus, despite image scoring being unstable in theory, a tendency to
base behaviour on reputations is evident in practice. One possibility is that people use the
‘standing’ [11] construct, which differs in that individuals can justifiably defect on a defector
without their reputations being harmed [12]. Such a strategy resolves the issues with evolution-
ary stability [13] but the requirement for second order reputational assessment increases the
information gathering and processing demands, restricting its use in practice [5]. There there-
fore remain fundamental difficulties in understanding both theoretically how indirect reciproc-
ity might have evolved [14], and empirically why people give more to co-operators.
There are two ways in which discrimination of cooperators may be effected. In all previous
treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals have been presented with potential recipients
and have had to decide how they would play, contingent upon their own strategy and the part-
ner’s reputation [3]. This question of how to respond to a partner’s previous moves has been
referred to as ‘partner control’ [15] and in the context of direct reciprocity, strategies related to
Tit-for-Tat [16] have received considerable attention. The second way to achieve discrimina-
tion is through partner choice. This is an important driver of social behaviour and a powerful
means by which direct reciprocity can be stabilized [17–20]. Here I introduce for the first time
the possibility of partner choice (strictly speaking recipient choice since interactions are one-
off and unidirectional) into a model of indirect reciprocity (see ref. [21] re the importance of
making this advance). I consider social groups in which individuals know the reputations of
others and can choose to whom to donate. My hypothesis is that provided there is at least one
other cooperator in a group, then individuals shouldn’t need to interact with defectors at all, so
a key issue with image scoring can be avoided and indirect reciprocity should lead to coopera-
tion at a stable, high level (see ref. [22] for similar reasoning and refs. [19,23–25] for examples
of the importance of opt-outs).
Methods
I modelled indirect reciprocity using a form of first-order reputation indexing related to image
scoring [2]. Scores were initialised at 0 for each individual in each generation (as in [2,13]), re-
flecting the fact that individuals begin their lives without experience. Scores then became -1 fol-
lowing defection and 1 following cooperation [26]. Strategies were defined by their thresholds
k, where k = -1 denotes individuals that cooperated unconditionally; k = 0 strategists cooper-
ated provided their partner had never played or had cooperated; k = 1 strategists cooperated
provided the partner had cooperated; and k = 2 strategists never cooperated. Individuals inter-
acted in groups of size g with default g = 100.
Interactions proceeded by the program randomly choosing a focal individual (i.e. an indi-
vidual upon whom operations are performed by the program) which then had an opportunity
to donate to a partner from the same group, conditional upon its own strategy and the partner’s
image score. Depending on the focal’s strategy, partners were either assigned randomly or were
selected as having positive image scores. Partner choice was implemented by presenting indi-
viduals with a randomly chosen partner from their group, and allowing the focal to reject the
partner until either (1) the partner had a positive image score, in which case partner choice was
successful; or (2) the program reached a giving up time that was set so that approximately all
group members were sampled in the search for one with a positive image score. In this case,
the focal had to settle for the last partner randomly assigned by the program [19].
In treatment conditions with random partner assignment, focals were assigned partners at
random from their group by the program. Individuals with k = 2 always had partners assigned
at random: k = 2 individuals always defect, so there is no question of choosing who to give to,
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as they never give. They are therefore simply assigned partners at random. There are no conse-
quences for the randomly assigned individual: they don’t receive anything, nor do they take
any action. The only consequence is that the k = 2 individual gains a negative image score,
which would be the same result regardless of the partner.
This interaction process was repeated such that every group member had on averagem
meetings with every other, either as donor or recipient, where by defaultm = 1. If the focal do-
nated, it incurred cost c = -1 and the partner received benefit b = 2. The donation cost-benefit
ratio was set to 1:2 rather than the 1:10 employed in some earlier studies [2] in order to be con-
servative regarding the evolution of cooperation. To avoid negative payoffs (which should not
occur in reality provided cooperating costs a small proportion of available resources), all focals
had their payoffs incremented by 1 each time they played.
A meta-population structure was used in which p = 10,000 individuals were distributed
evenly over i = 100 islands, where islands are units in which reproduction is structured. Note
that the default island size was equal to one group, but the parameters were distinct so that in-
teraction group size could be varied without affecting reproduction and drift. Simulations
started with equal proportions of all strategies and neutral image scores. This practice follows
previous authors e.g. [2], but it can be noted that the results reported were effectively identical
when starting from a population of all unconditional defectors. Simulations were evolutionary
in that those strategies accumulating the highest payoff produced most offspring. Reproduction
was based on the success of a strategy both within and between islands. The payoffs of all strat-
egies were summed, then individuals were assigned strategies in the next discrete generation in
proportion to the relative payoff of each strategy. An individual for the next generation was de-
rived locally with probability 0.9 and globally with probability 0.1. This reduced the potential
for genetic drift and allowed migration of successful strategies to other islands [13,26]. Popula-
tion size was therefore kept constant, with each generation being fully replaced by the next. Re-
production was accompanied by mutation: with probability μ = 0.01 an individual’s strategy
was replaced at random (any strategy could change to any other strategy without having to
track through an imposed sequence). Simulations were run for 10,000 generations.
Phenotypic defectors are individuals carrying a cooperative strategy yet defecting (which is
postulated to occur due to e.g. lack of resources) [27,28]. Phenotypic defectors were included in
selected simulations in order to allow comparison with earlier work that has shown they may
play a role in stabilizing cooperation. In simulations with phenotypic defectors, these were in-
troduced by constraining 10% of agents in each generation from cooperating, regardless of
their genetic strategy. The payoffs of those assigned to be phenotypic defectors within any one
generation nevertheless contributed to the relative payoff of the genetic strategy they carried.
In the model, as in most models of cooperation, image scores depend only upon the last
move. In a few models of indirect reciprocity (e.g. [13]), strategy thresholds are constant for
each player across rounds yet image scores are cumulative. This results in a situation whereby
it can pay to attend to one’s own image score and cooperate when in poor standing but not
when in good standing as there may be little to be gained because one’s image score already ex-
ceeds the population threshold for cooperating. The model presented here avoids such unreal-
istic internal inconsistencies and thereby avoids the artefactual complexities reported in [13].
Results
Evolution of cooperative strategies
I first replicated results for ‘pure’ image scoring with random assignment of partners and with
the inclusion of ‘phenotypic defectors’—individuals that carry a genetic basis for cooperation
yet only have the capacity to defect [27,28]. Looking first at the levels of cooperation which
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emerge (Fig 1), the inclusion of phenotypic defectors does lead to an increase [26]. However,
introducing partner choice (without phenotypic defectors) produces a much greater effect, al-
most doubling cooperation from 52.46 ± 1.54 with random assignment to 96.07 ± 0.11 with
choosiness (unless otherwise stated, means ± SEM are calculated across 10 simulations, where
within simulation means are calculated over 10,000 generations with the default parameters).
Thus, although introducing phenotypic defectors has some appeal in theory, partner choice is
much more effective in increasing cooperation.
Examining the proportions of each strategy (Fig 2) reveals that with pure image scoring
there is an almost even mix of all strategies. With phenotypic defectors, there is a balance be-
tween unconditionally cooperative strategies and those which cooperate with those with at
least neutral image scores. With partner choice, again almost all strategies are cooperative,
these now being divided between the cooperative thresholds (i.e. all except unconditional de-
fectors). This reflects the fact that all can now discriminate through choice of partner, so the
threshold becomes less important. So both processes lead to the dominance of potentially co-
operative strategies, though in practice, the presence of phenotypic defectors constrains the
number of actual cooperative acts (as reported in the discussion of Fig 1).
Fig 1. Cooperation with image scoring and partner choice. Percentage cooperation in simulations with pure image scoring with random assignment (IS);
incorporating phenotypic defectors (PD); and with partner choice (PC). Cooperation is plotted as themean ± SEM across 10 simulations of within simulation
means each calculated across all 10,000 generations. One way ANOVA, F2,27 = 422.42; p<0.0005; post-hoc Scheffe comparisons all significant at 0.0005 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129442.g001
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Examining the evolutionary dynamics further helps us to understand this mix of strategies
(Fig 3). With pure image scoring, the dynamics of all strategies are highly unstable with cycles
of cooperation and defection. These cycles are stabilized by the addition of phenotypic defec-
tors, however cooperation asymptotes at a moderately high level. In contrast, partner choice al-
lows total cooperation to reach a stable, almost maximal level. Note that the strategy thresholds
actually wander below the always-defect level: once a rule of choosing a partner with a positive
image score becomes established then the strategy threshold is released from selection (provid-
ed it is below the unconditional defection level).
The simulations reported here were initialized with an even mix of strategies, however ini-
tializing with 100% unconditional defectors results in indistinguishable average levels of coop-
eration and frequencies of strategies, confirming that partner choice can allow cooperation
to invade.
Discrimination
Partner choice is clearly effective at increasing cooperation via indirect reciprocity, but can we
show that individuals are expressing a partner preference? The mean image score of those de-
fected upon (on the scale from -1 to 1) was -0.83 ± 0.00 with pure image scoring versus
-0.93 ± 0.00 with partner choice (the difference from -1 reflecting defection when no individual
Fig 2. Strategies of image scoring and partner choice. Strategy mixes with pure image scoring with
random assignment (IS); incorporating phenotypic defectors (PD); and with partner choice (PC). Strategies
are labelled as IR[k] where k is the strategy threshold. Thus k = -1 denoted individuals that cooperated
unconditionally; k = 0 strategists cooperated provided their partner had never played or had cooperated; k = 1
strategists cooperated provided the partner had cooperated; and k = 2 strategists never cooperated. Proportions
are shown asmeans over 10 simulations of within simulation means calculated across 10,000 generations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129442.g002
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Fig 3. Dynamics of image scoring and partner choice. The evolutionary dynamics of indirect reciprocity
strategies for (A) pure image scoring with random assignment; (B) with phenotypic defectors; (C) with partner
choice. The first of 10 simulations is shown in each case. Strategies are labelled as IR[k] where k is the
strategy threshold. Thus k = -1 denoted individuals that cooperated unconditionally; k = 0 strategists
cooperated provided their partner had never played or had cooperated; k = 1 strategists cooperated provided
the partner had cooperated; and k = 2 strategists never cooperated. C is cooperation, plotted as the
proportion of cooperative moves.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129442.g003
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with positive image score was available; Fig 4), so choice did bring some degree of increased se-
lection against defectors (t18 = 25.66, p<0.0005). A more marked difference is apparent when
looking at those donated to. Here the mean image score was -0.13 ± 0.03 under partner assign-
ment but 0.92 ± 0.00 under partner choice (the difference from 1 reflecting the fact that where
recipients with positive image score are unavailable, focals will cooperate according to their
threshold; t18 = -31.87, p<0.0005). Thus, with pure image scoring there is on average close to
no discrimination by image score of who is given to, while under partner choice, there is almost
pure preference for co-operators.
Evolution of choice
I have shown that choosiness does support cooperation through indirect reciprocity, but would
a strategy of being choosy invade a non-choosy population? I ran simulations in which each in-
dividual’s strategy was a combination of two independent elements: an indirect reciprocity
threshold determining whether individuals would donate to partners (the thresholds being as
described in the Methods), and a choosiness element which determined whether the individual
would accept a random partner as a recipient or would express a preference for individuals with
positive image score (the implementation of the partner choice routine being as previously de-
scribed in the Methods). The result was that partner choice and random pairing were both
maintained in the population: those individuals using partner choice accounted for approxi-
mately half (49.73 +/- 0.76%) of strategies. A high level of cooperation was found, with occasion-
al invasion by defection lowering the mean to 87.68 ± 0.74%. Cooperation was associated with
the spread of those choosy strategies that are potentially cooperative (the sum of the frequencies
of strategies with k<2) correlated with cooperation (r = 0.71, p = 0.021, n = 10 simulations);
whereas the potentially cooperative non-choosy strategies did not (r = 0.02, p = 0.95, n = 10).
Direct reciprocity
When modelling indirect reciprocity it is instructive to limit the possibility for direct reciproc-
ity so that we can be sure any reciprocation is from third parties. The simplest way to do this is
Fig 4. Discrimination in image scoring and partner choice.Discrimination between recipients as shown
by the image scores of those with whom focal individuals cooperated (C) or defected (D), plotted as
means ± SEM for pure image scoring with random assignment (IS) and partner choice (PC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129442.g004
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to restrict the number of interactions so that the probability of any agent having the opportuni-
ty to receive back from an agent it has donated to is too small to determine the outcome [2]. In
the simulations presented, every agent had on average one interaction either as donor or recipi-
ent with every other individual (m = 1). To determine the effect of reducing the possibility of
direct reciprocation still further, I repeated the simulations with 1/50 the number of dyads
(m = 0.02), so each agent had on average approximately only one interaction as donor and one
as recipient in total in each generation. Mean cooperation over the 10,000 generations was
95.95 ± 0.14%, so the result is unchanged from the 96.07 ± 0.11 found under the default condi-
tions ofm = 1. We can therefore conclude that direct reciprocation is not a factor in explaining
the high levels of cooperation found with indirect reciprocity and partner choice.
Phenotypic defectors and partner choice
I have considered the introduction of phenotypic defectors and of partner choice separately.
For completeness, I also investigated introducing both simultaneously. This actually lowers co-
operation from the level of 96.07 ± 0.11 with partner choice and default parameters to
81.36 ± 0.00. This can be understood as being an inevitable consequence of introducing indi-
viduals that do not cooperate into an almost fully cooperative environment and so is not ex-
plored further here.
Group size
As group size decreases, there may be less opportunity to find a co-operator from within the
group and so it may be harder for cooperation to get established. I therefore investigated reduc-
ing the group size from the default of 100 to 10 while retainingm = 1. Results were very similar,
with a marginal reduction from 96.07 ± 0.11 to 94.91± 0.18% cooperation (Fig 5). Even with a
group size as low as 4, cooperation remains at a high level of 70.66 ± 1.91%. This reduced mean
at the lowest group sizes results from cycles of invading defection, as happens without partner
choice. This is consistent with the fact that at these group sizes there is effectively very little
choice available. Very small group sizes are not of interest for indirect reciprocity since the
point is to explain cooperation in large groups with few meetings per individual. In groups of 2,
Fig 5. Cooperation and group size. The mean level of cooperation across 10 simulations, each of 10,000
generations is shown in relation to the group size in which individuals interacted using image scoring with
partner choice, maintainingm = 1 and island size = 100. Standard errors are too small to be visible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129442.g005
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maintaining the parameterm = 1 to eliminate potential for direct reciprocity means that each
is on average a donor or recipient only once so reciprocity cannot produce a profit.
Standing
The reputation assignment mechanism of standing [11,13] provides an alternative to image scor-
ing, with the benefit of greater evolutionary stability but the drawback of requiring second order
information on prior behaviour in order to distinguish those defections which are ‘justifiable’ be-
cause they are with others who have themselves defected [12]. A version of the standing mecha-
nism was implemented as in [26] by modifying the reputation scoring routine such that defection
only produced a bad reputation when it was with an agent that had previously either cooperated
or not moved, otherwise the focal agent’s reputation remained unchanged. Based on previous re-
sults showing that standing can engender high levels of cooperation under indirect reciprocity
[26], I predicted that partner choice would have little additional impact on the evolutionary dy-
namics. This was upheld, with standing in a partner assignment regime giving 84.71 ± 0.47% co-
operation (with default parameters) and partner choice increasing this to 96.22 ± 0.09%, a figure
almost identical to that with image scoring and partner choice (96.07 ± 0.11). Thus, when indi-
viduals can choose partners, the benefits of having second order information disappear: partner
choice can produce very high levels of cooperation even without the complexity of knowing the
context in which players gained their reputations.
Costs of choice
I have assumed that individuals in groups have information on their group-mates and can se-
lect with whom they interact in a cost-free way. However, it is also possible that if potential
partners are presented one at a time, there may be some cost in rejecting one and holding out
for a better partner. This may take the form of an opportunity cost such that with a given
probability, the focal then fails to find a further partner. This was implemented such that a
focal could only proceed with the interaction with probability p raised to the power of the
number of partners it had rejected before finding one that was acceptable. If this condition
was not satisfied then a new focal was chosen. This procedure meant that the total number of
interactions was retained, but that non-choosy individuals had a greater proportion of the in-
teractions. I found that, as one might predict, costs of choice did reduce both cooperation and
choosinesss, but that both were remarkably robust. With p = 0.5 (i.e. each time a partner was
rejected it halved the chance of that focal being able to play) cooperation was retained at
80.38 ± 1.26% with 42.98 ± 0.86% of individuals being choosy. Even with p = 0.1, cooperation
was 72.34 ± 1.31% and choosy strategies accounted for 36.61 ± 0.88%. Thus the cost of choice
is an important factor to consider but it does little to impede the evolution of cooperation
through partner choice.
Discussion
To conclude, partner choice overcomes the issues that image scoring has with instability, and
allows reliably high levels of cooperation without direct reciprocation even in the smallest
groups. This is achieved through a simple mechanism without invoking the complexities of
phenotypic defectors [27,28], standing [11,13], tolerance [29], or evolving social networks [14].
The key to the effectiveness of choice is that it allows much higher levels of discrimination.
Under pure image scoring, those donated to are as likely to be defectors as co-operators. Coop-
eration requires a correlation between giving and receiving, and partner choice assures this, al-
lowing almost perfect contingency such that only those who have given are given to. Unlike
Indirect Reciprocity with Partner Choice
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under pure image scoring there is no temptation to cooperate with defectors just to preserve
one’s own reputation—instead they can simply be avoided.
The impact of partner choice can be understood within the existing analytical framework
for understanding image scoring. If cooperation depends upon the level of “acquaintanceship”
or q [30] then rather than being limited by the average of q across all those an individual might
meet, individuals can choose to interact with those for which their knowledge of cooperative-
ness is maximal. Thus the condition for cooperation to work under indirect reciprocity is
much more readily satisfied.
The model presented here should be tested using an experiment in which people are able to
choose who (if any) in their group to donate to. The prediction is that people should demon-
strate strong discrimination between recipients, resulting in a high level of cooperation through
indirect reciprocity. One study of cleaner fish presented individuals with a choice of cooperat-
ing and defecting partners and did find evidence of image scoring [31].
The results here provide further support for the role of partner choice in driving reputation-
based cooperation. A number of studies have shown how those individuals who are seen to be
the most cooperative are the most sought after partners for alliances, or repeated mutually-ben-
eficial relationships, and that this can drive strategic investment in cooperation [32,33]. This
study provides evidence that partner choice can also stabilize cooperation in the context of
one-off, one-way donations without re-meeting.
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